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Abstract 
 
Britain offers a case in which much greater experience of competition in the public transport sector can 
be seen than in other European countries. Examples are drawn from this experience, showing that 
outcomes differ between the long-distance and local markets, price competition functioning much more 
effectively in the former. In many respects, the competitive bidding process may be seen as more 
important and extensive than direct ‘on the road’ inter-operator competition within the same mode over 
the same routes. Experiences from competitive tendering and franchising are reviewed. Contradictions 
between competition policy and wider transport policies remain to be resolved. 
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Introduction 
 
The public transport system of Great Britain has experienced a greater degree of 
privatisation and deregulation than any other in Europe, commencing with the Transport 
Act of 1980, which deregulated the express coach market. Such competition has 
occurred both within modes (for example, between bus operators over the same route), 
and between modes (for example, between express coach and rail, and between public 
and private modes). The most obvious form of such competition from the passengers’ 
point of view is that where competing operators offer services over the same route, 
sometimes referred to as ‘on the road competition’, or ‘competition in the market’ in the 
road transport sector. However, the extent of this is not particularly great, and has 
tended to diminish. The other form, which has closer parallels with that found elsewhere 
in Europe, is that ‘for the market’ or ‘off road’ competition, in which a single operator is 
given a contract to run a service, but a competitive bidding process takes place. The 
principal example is the bus network in Greater London. Such bids are usually invited at 
the level of individual routes in the bus sector, but at the level of substantial networks in 
the rail franchising process. 
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The main sequence of events 
 
Until the late 1970s public transport in Britain was provided largely by publicly-
owned operators, especially in terms of the scheduled service network. The national rail 
system was operated by British Rail (BR), a nationalised industry. Most urban bus 
services were provided by operators owned and controlled directly by their local 
authorities (the ‘municipals’), with most rural and regional services provided by 
subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies - the National Bus Company (NBC) in 
England and Wales, and Scottish Bus Group (SBG) in Scotland. London Transport 
directly controlled and owned the underground (metro) system and bus services within 
Greater London. 
In many respects the situation was similar to that found elsewhere in Europe at that 
time (and to some extent still today). There were, however, some differences: no 
significant use was made of sub-contracting services to private operators within a state-
owned network (which was well-established in the regional bus networks of Belgium, 
for example). While most long-distance express coaches were run by NBC and SBG 
subsidiaries, and very few all-year-round services by smaller private companies, there 
was substantial competition between coach and rail on many routes, unlike the situation 
in most other European countries even today. Within the non-scheduled market (for 
example, contracts for transport of schoolchildren awarded by local authorities) strong 
competition has existed for many years, and small private operators played a major role. 
During the 1970s increased levels of financial support were paid to public transport 
operators to ensure continuation of services in low-density areas, to fund capital 
spending, and in some urban areas to finance substantially lower levels of fares and 
higher levels of service than would be justified commercially (notably the South 
Yorkshire conurbation). Concessionary fares (i.e. fares specified for certain categories 
of person at a level lower than operators would charge commercially, in some cases 
permitting free off-peak travel) had become important, especially for pensioners. 
However, there were concerns that large sums were being paid to incumbent operators 
with little influence over their operating efficiency. Innovations in types of service were 
also limited. A shift to a deregulated and privatised market was therefore seen by some 
as a means of offsetting these dangers.  
 
 
Coach and Bus Deregulation 
 
Following the election of a Conservative party government in 1979 a marked shift in 
policy took place. The Transport Act 1980 deregulated the express coach and tourist 
sector, removing the need for route licences or authorisation of fares to be charged. 
However little privatisation initially took place in the public transport services as such: 
for example, the dominant express coach operator, National Express, was not privatised 
until 1988 – the early 1980s period of intensive competition between it and British Rail 
was thus a case of competition between operators both still within the public sector. 
Control of London Transport was transferred in 1984 from the then Greater London 
Council to a state-appointed board. While bus services were not deregulated, a policy of 
private sector tendering for all services was introduced. 
A more radical change emerged through the Transport Act 1985, which deregulated 
local bus services (other than in London and Northern Ireland), removing both fares and 
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service controls. Network-wide financial support was removed, although operators were 
compensated on more consistent basis than before for revenue loss due to concessionary 
fares. It was accepted that not all services would be operated commercially, even if 
sharp reductions in costs occurred, and a system of competitive tendering was 
introduced for those services (for example, in low-density rural areas). Privatisation of 
NBC companies took place in the period 1985-1988, followed by that of the SBG 
subsidiaries. The process was more gradual in the ‘municipal’ sector, and about fifteen 
such operators remain today. 
 
 
Rail privatisation 
 
The Railways Act 1993 introduced a complex system of privatisation for the national 
rail network. The infrastructure was placed under a separate company, Railtrack plc 
(succeeded from 2002 by Network Rail, a semi-public organisation). Freight operations 
were sold directly to private sector businesses, together with the passenger rolling stock 
under rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs). The passenger rail services were 
placed under twenty-five area franchises, for which private sector operators were invited 
to make bids. While some of the changes (notably separation of infrastructure and 
operations) could be seen as requirements imposed by EU policy, Britain went much 
further than any other European country in placing both under private sector ownership. 
As mentioned above, a distinction should be made between privatisation and 
deregulation – in the rail case, it could be argued that greater regulation was introduced 
at the time of privatisation - for example, in control of some fare categories, and 
detailed specification of service levels for passenger operators - than had been the case 
previously, under BR control. Apart from some services in the Passenger Transport 
Executive areas (major cities outside London), revenue risk in rail franchising is taken 
by the franchise operator 
 
 
Change since 1997 
 
The election of the ‘New Labour’ government under Mr Blair in 1997 did not see a 
significant reversal of these policies. Privatised companies have not been returned to 
public ownership and some further small-scale privatisation has taken place in the 
municipal bus sector. A greater emphasis has been placed on integration of services, but 
a striking conflict is found between this aim and the stringent competition policy 
applied in the economy as a whole, which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.  
Under the Transport Act 2000 rail franchising was transferred to the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA), and powers were introduced to permit ‘Quality Contracts’ (QCs) and 
statutory ‘Quality Partnerships’ (SQPs) to be set up, under which some elements of re-
regulation of bus services would be reintroduced. QCs enable arrangements similar to 
those in London to be established in other parts of Britain, while SQPs would enable 
formal quality partnerships to be set up between bus operators and local authorities. So 
far, no QCs have been set up although considerable interest has been expressed in their 
potential by the Passenger Transport Executives. Only one SQP has been set up, in 
Scotland, but informal quality partnerships play a useful role in many areas. The SRA 
has itself been abolished under subsequent legislation, and franchising is now handled 
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directly by the Department for Transport (DfT). Changes under the 2000 Act have in 
practice had relatively little effect, representing a change of emphasis rather than 
substance to changes introduced in the previous two decades. 
A policy of greater significance enacted by the New Labour government has been that 
of devolving powers to elected bodies in certain regions of Britain – the Scottish 
Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Greater London Assembly. The directly-
elected Mayor of Greater London also has extensive transport powers. In London, a 
much higher level of financial support for public transport has been introduced, 
enabling lower real fares and higher service levels to be offered to users, and the 
congestion charge introduced in 2003 has also assisted public transport. However, the 
principle of competitive contracting of bus services to private operators has been 
retained. 
 
 
Urban Railways 
 
The London Underground system remains under public ownership, but subsequently 
under Labour a ‘Public Private Partnership‘ (PPP) was introduced in 2003, under which 
thirty-year contracts have been made with two private consortia for maintenance and 
renewal of infrastructure and rolling stock, while direct operations remain under public 
control – in effect, the opposite of the policy adopted in Stockholm for the metro (the 
‘Tunnelbana’) in which competitive franchising has been introduced for service 
operations, but the infrastructure remains under public ownership and control (White 
and Ball 2003). Some small urban rail networks in Tyne & Wear and Glasgow remain 
wholly under public sector control. New light rail systems have been introduced in 
several cities, all operated by private sector companies, with various arrangements for 
funding (most ultimately from the public sector) and duration of franchises. The latter 
may conflict with current European Commission proposals, notably the Croydon 
Tramlink in London, which has a franchise running to 99 years 
 
 
The long-distance market 
 
The role of competition in the long-distance market differs radically from that in the 
local market, generally with more scope for commercially-viable operation. Most of the 
express coach, and domestic air, networks are operated commercially with little need for 
public tendering or franchising except in some very low density areas. Inter-modal 
competition is a striking feature, with rail, air, and coach serving the major trunk routes, 
while rail and coach compete for many lower-density flows. In addition to this, price 
competition appears to function much more effectively than in the intra-urban and local 
markets, associated with a high short-run price elasticity (in the order of –1.0) and a 
greater tendency by users to pre-plan their journeys.  
A partial exception can be seen in the case of long-distance rail services. Under the 
BR structure, the inter-city sector was marginally profitable, on the basis of costing 
system then used (even though it was allocated the great majority of infrastructure costs 
on those routes it shared with regional and freight traffic, on the ‘prime user’ principle). 
However, the separation of infrastructure and rolling stock provision under the 
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framework of rail privatisation (see above) resulted in greatly increased costs, as result 
of which the five principal long-distance franchises all required financial support from 
the state at their inception in 1996/97. An exception to this was the ‘Gatwick Express’ 
service between central London and Gatwick Airport (which had been part of the ‘Inter 
City’ sector under BR ownership, but is now classified with London & South East 
regional franchise operators), which operated commercially from the outset, and has 
paid a premium back to the state (Strategic Rail Authority 2002).  
 
 
Express coach deregulation 
 
The outcome of express coach deregulation in the early 1980s illustrates the rapid 
change that can occur in the long-distance market, especially in price levels. The main 
incumbent operator, National Express (NE, a subsidiary of NBC) faced competition 
from many smaller operators entering the market from October 1980. However, it in 
turn was able to make immediate changes in services and fare levels as a result of 
deregulation, both in response to newcomers in the coach sector, and the railways.  
In contrast, the experience of smaller operator entering the coach market was very 
mixed. Many of their new services did not survive beyond a 2-3 period year after 
deregulation in 1980. While offering low operating costs, and in some cases innovations 
in service quality, they faced difficulty in advertising their product. At that time, much 
coach travel was sold through traditional travel agents, and many new operators did not 
establish such sales outlets from the start of operations. In some cases, a period of loss-
making operation might be necessary in order to build up demand. Even when NE 
increased its fares substantially in the late 1980s, resulting in a substantial loss of traffic 
broadly consistent with the –1.0 elasticity mentioned above, very little new independent 
competition emerged. Subsequent real fares reductions by NE stimulated a recovery in 
its total passenger volume (White 1999). 
While almost all coach services are operated commercially, this sector nonetheless 
offers an interesting example of competitive tendering within the private sector. 
National Express (in England and Wales) and the similar Scottish Citylink network are 
largely operated by vehicles and drivers contracted in from other operators, while 
offering to the public common brand name, through ticketing and an integrated network. 
Contracting operators include regional subsidiaries of major bus groups such as 
Stagecoach, but also smaller independent firms. Hence, advantages may be obtained 
through use of locally-based operators, and competitive bidding to control cost levels 
and stimulate service quality. Revenue risk is taken by the network operator, but 
contractors are appraised on service quality provided as well as costs. Conversely, in the 
local bus market very little of this type of operation is found, contracting occurring at 
the initiative of public sector bodies where commercially-viable services are not 
registered by bus operators. 
 
 
Rail privatisation in the long-distance market 
 
At privatisation, the five major service groups in this sector were franchised 
separately, becoming known by the names of the successful bidders as Great North 
Eastern (GNER), Midland Main Line (MML), Virgin West Coast, Virgin Cross Country 
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and First Great Western (FGW). Aggregate ridership and financial data for this group is 
broadly comparable in definition with that for the intercity sector under BR (apart from 
Gatwick Express as mentioned above). In addition, some other regional franchised train 
operating companies offer long-distance services (for example, Scotrail between major 
Scottish cities). Direct competition between the five major long-distance franchises is 
very limited, although in some cases regional franchises offer competition from parallel 
routes, notably Chiltern Railways between London and Birmingham with Virgin West 
Coast. 
All franchises were awarded as a result of a competitive bidding process, primarily 
geared to offering year-on-year reductions vis a vis the level of financial support offered 
to the corresponding businesses at the time of privatisation. All five long-distance 
franchises required net financial support from the state when they began (although the 
intercity sector had earlier been profitable) as a result of much higher access charges 
(paid to Railtrack) and rolling stock leasing charges than the equivalent costs within the 
integrated BR structure. However, benefiting from substantial ridership and revenue 
growth, GNER and MML were paying a surplus (‘premium’) back to the state by 2001-
02. FGW also greatly reduced the net support required (Strategic Rail Authority 2002). 
All three businesses have been profitable to their owners, after allowing for the net 
effects of franchise payments and premia. By and large existing infrastructure and 
rolling stock has been used, with some additional high-speed trains delivered to MML 
and FGW, and minor infrastructure improvements. New franchises recently awarded to 
GNER and FGW involve substantial and premia being paid over the next ten years, 
clearly assuming large revenue growth, especially in the former. 
A much more mixed pattern has been found in respect of the two Virgin companies, 
whose bidding strategy was based on assumptions of very large ridership and revenue 
growth. These in turn depended on successful implementation of major changes in 
infrastructure and rolling stock to permit much more frequent and faster high speed 
services. Especially in the case of Virgin West Coast, this process was much slower 
than expected, resulting in severe shortfalls in ridership and net revenue vis a vis 
forecast. In 2002 both franchises were re-negotiated with the SRA, with a fixed profit 
margin for the operator (Transit 2006a, 2006b).  
Table 1 shows trends in total rail use for the long-distance services and other sectors. 
Note that growth in the long-distance sector has been lower than in others, especially in 
terms of passenger-km, in part due to strong domestic airline competition. However, the 
higher proportion of costs already covered at the time of privatisation enabled the 
revenue growth to be sufficient to bring some of them into profitability during this 
period. 
In aggregate, ridership on the five main long-distance franchises grew strongly 
between 1997 and 2000, but was then seriously affected by the consequences of a major 
accident at Hatfield (on the GNER route about 30 km north of London). This was 
caused by a failure to maintain track adequately, and resulted in an emergency 
programme of track renewal over much of the network, which severely disrupted long-
distance services. Growth subsequently resumed. Total passenger-km on the five 
franchises rose from 10,100m in 1994/95 to 13,400m in 2004/05 (by 33%). Journeys 
rose somewhat more, from 54m to 84m (i.e. by 55%), indicating a reduction in average 
journey length from about 187 to 160 km, probably associated with a shift for longer 
journeys to air. Further comment on the franchise process as such is made later in this 
paper.  
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Table 1: Trends in Rail Ridership in Britain 1994-95 to 2004-05. 
Year                                      Sector    
  Long-distance    All operators 
 
  Passenger    Passenger        Passenger  Passenger   
  trips (m)      kilometres (‘000 m)      trips (m)    kilometres (‘000m) 
1994-95 54         10.1   735       28.7 
1999-2000 72         13.2              931       38.5 
2004-2005 84         13.4            1088       42.4 
 
% change 
94/95 – 04/05 +55%          +33%             +48%       +47%  
Source : SRA National Trends 2004-04, Tables 1.1b and 1.2b 
 
 
‘Open access’ rail competition 
 
There is also an element of direct competition permitted within the privatised rail 
sector, through the possibility of ‘open access’ operators gaining new services. These 
are train operating companies introducing new services, as distinct from franchises 
based on existing areas of operations, with which they tend to compete. The principal 
example to date is Hull Trains (now a subsidiary of First Group), which introduced a 
through service between Hull and London via the East Coast Main Line (ECML) in 
2000 (Perren 2006). It serves a large regional city otherwise offered only a very limited 
through frequency by GNER, or reliant on connecting services. It has become 
successfully established, enhancing its original frequency and buying new 200 kph 
trains. A further open access operator hoping to start service shortly is Grand Central, 
offering services from Sunderland in North East England, also using the ECML. 
However, a major problem arises in the use of track capacity when such operations 
are introduced. The ECML south of Doncaster (junction for Hull) has limited track 
capacity, used mainly by GNER. Additional operators limit the number of train paths 
available for GNER to expand services, or for freight operations. The issue of track cost 
allocation also arises – franchises bear the existing track costs for routes they serve, 
while open access operators pay a much smaller variable charge (in effect, a lower 
average charge per train-km than the franchised operator). This raises questions of ‘fair’ 
competition – in contrast to Germany, for example, there is no generally-published tariff 
of track access charges in Britain. Additional trains on a congested route also impose an 
‘opportunity cost’ by displacing other trains, as well as direct costs in terms of track 
maintenance, etc. (Nash et al 2004). 
A particular issue in the EMCL case is that GNER has recently won a new franchise 
for a ten-year period, based on assumptions of strong revenue and volume growth, 
linked with additional trains between London and Leeds which will use the London - 
Doncaster section. It is uncertain whether capacity will exist for these, given a decision 
by the Office of Rail Regulation to propose permitting operations by Grand Central. A 
conflict clearly exists in that Network Rail has disputed whether sufficient capacity 
exists on ECML for operations additional to those already planned by GNER, and 
GNER’s own franchise bid was accepted by the government on a basis on additional 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 69-82 
 76
Leeds services being feasible over the infrastructure available. Different public agencies 
appear to be acting inconsistently in this respect. 
 
Competition in the local transport market 
 
The local transport market is taken here as that within urban areas, and from 
surrounding regions into urban centres. It contrasts with the longer-distance, or 
interurban, market in several respects. Within public transport modes in particular, 
relatively inelastic journey purposes (such as work, and education, etc.) tend to 
dominate, resulting in low overall short-run price elasticity of around –0.4 (Balcombe et 
al 2004). Hence, unless there is very much higher price cross-elasticity between 
operators, overall real fare reductions are unlikely to sustain aggregate revenue levels. 
While demand certainly responds to lower real price levels, this may require substantial 
increases in public expenditure to provide the necessary financial support, as can be 
seen in London since 1999. 
In contrast to long-distance journeys, there is much less tendency by the user to plan 
ahead, although some journeys may display habitual patterns (such as the timing of the 
home to work trip). Given the high frequencies offered on many urban services, the 
rational user will arrive at stops or stations independently of the scheduled timetable, 
since the ‘search time’ taken to compare timetables or other information may be high 
relative to waiting time thereby saved. Where bus services run around 5 times per hour 
or more, this appears to be the general pattern (White, Turner and Mbara 1992). Taking 
a typical revenue per trip of 80 pence (an average allowing for child and off-bus tickets) 
a 25% reduction would bring the average revenue down to 60p, i.e. by 20 pence. 
Although bus users have low values of time, there is strong evidence that a greater 
weighting is attached to walk and wait time. For example, given an in-vehicle value of 
time of £3 per hour (approx Euros 4.50) and a walk/wait time weighting of 1.7 
(Balcombe et al 2004, tables 7.l and 7.14), wait time would be valued at about £5 per 
hour (Euros 7.50), or about 8 pence per minute. Hence, it would be only worthwhile for 
a user to wait an additional 3 minutes to catch the lower-fare bus.  
A parallel may be drawn in this respect with taxi services, in which price competition 
for services hailed on street or at ranks appears to be similarly limited by the search time 
offsetting price benefits. 
There are severe practical limits to the complexity of pricing policy, especially where 
fare collection on the vehicles results in high boarding times, thus affecting service 
speed. In many respects simplified fare structures may stimulate higher ridership by 
improving convenience to the user, although scope certainly exists for peak/off-peak 
differential pricing to spread demand, and for price discrimination by user group (such 
as lower fares for those aged 16-19). 
 
 
Local bus deregulation in Britain 
 
The Transport Act of 1985 introduced a system of ‘deregulation’ from October 1986, 
except in Northern Ireland and Greater London. Instead of the incumbent operator 
receiving direct financial support from local authorities, operators were encouraged to 
register services as ‘commercial’, i.e. at a fare level set by the operator itself, all costs 
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would be covered, without the need for specific financial support. It should be stressed 
that where compensation is paid in respect of revenue foregone due to concessionary 
fares, this is regarded (quite reasonably) as commercial income by the operator, rather 
than a ‘subsidy’. Also, in the British case, bus operators pay a low net rate of fuel duty 
(20% of that applied to other road transport), which effectively reduces total costs by 
around 10%.  
In addition to removing any control of fares for ‘commercial’ services, the Act also 
introduced a simple registration procedure (at the time, requiring 42 days’ notice) 
whereby an operator registers the intended route and timetable, without other operators 
being able to raise objections. Hence, competition was permitted in that more than one 
operator could register a service over the same route, and by the ability of operators to 
specify their own fares. 
It was accepted that not all services could be operated commercially. Where a local 
authority wishes to see services offered that are not registered commercially, it is free to 
specify the service required. Where only a small expenditure is involved, de minimus 
rules apply, i.e. a contract can be negotiated without the need for competitive tendering 
(this might cover, for example, diversion of a rural service via a village off the main 
route). However, in the early years of deregulation in particular, this was a very low 
figure, and the greater majority of tendered services are the subject of a competitive 
bidding process, typically generating around three bids per contract (ATCO 2005). 
There is no compulsion on local authorities to provide a level of service additional to 
those run commercially, except for the obligation to provide free travel between home 
and school for children living above certain distances (3 miles, or 4.8 km, in the case of 
those aged 8 upward). 
In practice, many rural services are secured through a competitive tendering process 
(in some cases combining the school journeys with other services in a single contract). 
The tendering process also applied to some urban services, notably at times of low 
demand (evening and Sundays). Hence, the same route may be operated commercially 
for part of the week, but as a tendered service (and not necessarily by the same operator) 
at other times. 
Overall, about 84% of registered local bus vehicle-km outside London were operated 
commercially, the remaining 16% as contracted services. This proportion remained 
stable for about fifteen years, although it has now risen to about 22% as a result of 
additional rural services being introduced and ‘deregistrations’ of commercial services 
no longer considered viable by their operators. Table 2 indicates trends. 
 
Table 2: Trends in commercial and contracted bus kilometres, Great Britain outside London 
Year   Bus-kilometres   Percentage of total 
    (m)   
  Commercial Contracted  Commercial     Contracted 
 
1990-91  1803    340   84.1   15.9 
1994-95  1937  357   84.4   15.6 
1999-2000       1934  373   83.8   16.2 
2004-05  1689             456   78.3   21.7 
Source: Derived from Transport Statistics Bulletin SB(05)31 ‘Public Transport Statistics Bulletin GB: 
2005 Editon’ Department for Transport, London, September 2006, Annex A, table 3. 
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While the extent of direct ’on the road’ competition between bus operators is limited, 
and absent in most areas, it can be argued that the threat of competition, and the 
stimulus to register services as ‘commercial’ certainly helped to stimulate a radical 
reduction in operating costs, which fell by over 40% in real terms per bus-kilometre by 
the late 1990s (an average for the whole network, both commercial and tendered), 
although rising since then (White 2005). 
 
 
The London case 
 
As mentioned above, London is an exception in that bus operations were not 
‘deregulated’ under the 1985 Act, but a system of competitive contracting for services 
was introduced from about the same time. Initially, most bus operations remained under 
public ownership, but subsequently the bus companies owned by London Transport 
were privatised in the early 1990s, competing with each other and with newcomers for 
service contracts. The process of extending competitive contracting over the whole 
network was relatively slow, in contrast to the abrupt changes introduced outside 
London in October 1986. However, almost all services now operate on this basis. The 
only public sector operation remaining is a small company owned directly by Transport 
for London, ‘East Thames Buses’, which can bid competitively with the private sector 
operators and also serves as operator of last resort where private sector operators are 
unwilling to bid, or failed operators have to be replaced at short notice.  
Unlike the deregulated areas, there is no separation of ‘commercial’ and ‘tendered’ 
services, the whole service on each route being the subject of a single contract. Fares 
policy is determined for the network as a whole, enabling a very high proportion of off-
bus ticketing, notably through the use of the ‘Oyster’ smartcard with stored value 
capacity. Very comprehensive passenger information on services is provided by TfL 
The London system can thus be seen as having parallels with National Express in 
offering a single integrated network to the user, while enabling a system of competitive 
bidding to control costs and raise service quality. In the early years, the over-riding 
objective was to minimise costs, but more recently a greater emphasis has been placed 
on improved service quality (especially reliability) through the use of ‘Quality Incentive 
Contracts’ (QICs). A recent review by a scrutiny committee of the London Assembly 
has endorsed this approach (London Assembly 2006). About three bids for each 
contract are now attracted on average, but in some cases competition has been more 
limited. 
A limitation on the degree of competition in London has resulted from the sale of 
existing operating depots with incumbent companies when the London Buses subsidiary 
companies were privatised. Given high property values and difficulties in obtaining 
planning consent, it may be difficult for newcomers to set up new operating centres on a 
substantial scale. In some cases, existing coach operators with operating bases in 
London were well-placed to expand into bus operations (such as Armchair in West 
London). In some cases, TfL has retained ownership of depots, which has assisted 
incoming operators in setting up operations. 
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Rail franchising in regional and London and South East region services 
 
The rail franchising process described above in respect of long-distance operators 
applied in similar form to services in the London & South East region, and in other 
regions. The former comprise franchises based on segments of the radial commuter 
network into London which also operate local services in their areas (such as South 
West Trains, covering routes from the regions south west of London into Waterloo 
terminal), together with one cross-London route, Thameslink, recently incorporated into 
the ‘First Capital Connect’ franchise. The latter comprises networks of services in 
regions outside London, generally serving much lower-density markets even when 
operations in major cities outside London are included (such as Central Trains, covering 
the West Midlands conurbation and a very large rural region in central England). 
The first round of franchises let in 1996/97 was generally based on accepting the bids 
involving the lowest network costs to the government, either in terms of reducing 
subsidy payments, and/or ability to provide premia. Within the London & South East 
region, this approach was generally successful, since services already covered a high 
proportion of costs and substantial ridership growth (associated with increased 
employment and economic activity in London, as well as initiatives by operators) 
provided similar growth in real revenue. Some franchises were able to move into paying 
premia back to the state : Thameslink, and First Great Eastern (SRA 2002). Only in one 
case, Connex South East, did substantial financial problems develop, resulting in 
services reverting to a state-owned operation until being refranchised in 2006 to a new 
private sector operator. 
Conversely, the regional franchises outside London and the trunk routes ran into 
substantial difficulties, and eventually all had to be rescued by the state within the first 
franchise period as a result of optimistic bids. While substantial revenue growth did 
occur, the lower proportion of total costs covered by fares revenue meant that only 
modest reductions in subsidy payments were possible. For example, in the case of a 
London & South East franchise covering 80% of costs from passenger revenue in its 
first year, revenue growth of 25% would enable it to cover all costs. A regional 
franchise covering only 30% of its total costs in the first year would only cover 37.5% 
of its total costs given corresponding revenue growth, and would thus remain highly 
dependent on subsidy. While some cost reductions were possible in franchised 
operations, these were far less dramatic than in the case of bus operations, given that the 
great majority of costs were incurred through access payment to Railtrack, and rolling 
stock leasing, and most changes in financial performance have come about through 
revenue growth. 
Under the second round of franchising, the boundaries of some franchise areas have 
been changed, mainly to enable greater operational integration. For example, three 
operators serving the East Anglia region were merged into a single franchise, now 
operated by the ‘one’ company. The generally strong financial performance of the long-
distance and London & South East operators, especially given further projected revenue 
growth in these sectors, has highlighted the poor financial performance of the regional 
franchises. They now represent the majority of all state financial support to franchised 
operators, but only small share total of passenger-km on rail.  
 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 69-82 
 80
Some observations on tendering, franchising and competition policy 
 
In many respects, there is more competition within the public transport industry in 
Britain for the right to operate services than ‘on the road’ (or rail) between operators. 
This applies to almost all bus services in London, the franchising process for national 
rail services and most of the 22% of bus-kilometres in deregulated areas run on contract 
to local authorities (plus the very large school contract market). 
Under such conditions, it may also be easier to displace an operator whose 
performance has proved unsatisfactory through termination of contract and seeking an 
alternative provider, than may be the case in deregulated markets where one operator is 
clearly dominant in an area but is providing a poor service. While in theory other 
operators could then enter the market, in practice doing so on substantial scale may be 
difficult. 
In bidding for a contract (generally applicable to individual routes) or a franchise 
(generally applicable to entire rail networks) a prospective operator needs to make a 
realistic estimate of costs. This would include allowance for possible operating 
efficiency gains, and likely input costs levels (for example, in labour costs), although in 
some cases elements are indexed in contract agreements, such as fuel (ATCO 2005). 
Where only the ‘cost risk’ is being taken, and revenue is treated separately, then the 
contract is generally referred to as a ‘gross cost’ contract, i.e. the operator is paid the 
total operating costs for a specified service, while revenue (if applicable) is received by 
the contracting authority. A long-established example is contracting for school bus 
services, on which passengers are carried free of charge and hence no direct revenue is 
received. This may also be applicable to many other forms of competitive contracting, 
such as road maintenance or refuse disposal. 
In such cases the operator clearly needs to make a sensible estimate of the costs 
involved. Where too low an estimate enables a contract to be obtained, yet costs cannot 
be covered from the anticipated payments, the “winner’s curse” may be said to exist, in 
which the successful bidder ultimately may have to withdraw from provision of the 
service, even where contractual penalties are incurred as result. 
In many cases, the bidding process also involves the ‘revenue risk’ being taken by the 
bidder, i.e. a ‘net cost’ bid is made for the sum required to make up the difference 
between costs and revenues. In theory, this incentivises the operator to maximise 
revenue once a contract has been awarded (for example, through greater attention to 
service quality and marketing), since the revenue gain is received directly. However, 
imposition of greater risk may accentuate the “winner’s curse” effect where over-
optimism has occurred in both cost and revenue calculations – regional rail franchises 
are one example, and the decision by National Express to pull out of a franchise for part 
of the tramway network in Melbourne is another (see Stanley, 2006). In some cases, an 
authority seeking to secure bids may obtain better value for money by using gross cost 
rather than net cost methods, since the former imposes less risk on operators and hence 
smaller firms (often with lower operating costs) may be more inclined to bid (White and 
Tough 1995). 
In the case of rail franchising, bidding has generally been on a ‘net cost’ basis, i.e. 
revenue risk is borne by the operator, except for some urban rail franchises in the first 
round after privatisation. However, this is in the context of a growing market, and the 
ability to spread revenue risk over a substantial network rather than a single route, 
which may be the case with bus service contracts. 
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A further issue arising in the British case has been the role of competition policy. The 
Transport Act of 1985 removed previous exemptions from competition policy as it then 
existed. Subsequent further Acts have greatly strengthened the powers of bodies 
involved in the implementation and enforcement of this policy, notably the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission. Collusive behaviour (such as 
price-fixing or market sharing) is deterred by strong penalties. Which arguments may 
exist for such policies in the economy as a whole to stimulate competition and hence 
efficiency, it is debatable whether their strict application to the public passenger 
transport sector is necessarily appropriate, given the limited scale of ’on the road’ 
competition in practice. Many critics have pointed out the contradiction between the 
strict enforcement of competition policy in Britain with transport policies per se, 
notably those directed to greater co-ordination and of integration of services. Some 
changes have been introduced, notably the ‘Block Exemption’ of the OFT for certain 
types of ticketing, which enables operators to offer interavailable return tickets and 
travelcards, but it remains difficult for operators to co-ordinate services over common 
sections of route. 
A particularly curious feature of the implementation of competition policy has been 
its application to cases of rail franchising after franchises have been allocated, as noted 
by Finney (2006). For example, in the case of recent franchise awards to National 
Express for services throughout East Anglia, and to First for services in Scotland, 
subsequent investigations were mounted by competition authorities into the implications 
for competition within the areas concerned (for example, in respect of National Express 
Group controlling both rail and express coach services in the same region, and First 
running many bus services as well as the rail network in Scotland). At the very least, it 
would seem appropriate for such enquiries to be conducted in advance of, or in parallel 
with, the process of franchise allocation. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Britain offers a case in which much greater experience of competition in the public 
transport sector can be seen than in other European countries. This applies in different 
ways in the long-distance and local markets, price competition functioning much more 
effectively in the former. In many respects, the competitive bidding process may be 
seen as more important and extensive than direct inter-operator competition within the 
same mode over the same routes. The degree of risk taken by bidders may be important 
in determining the number of bids received, and the ability to operate for the whole 
duration of a contract. Contradictions between competition policy and wider transport 
policies remain to be resolved. 
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